A Philosophical Dive into Sweden’s Immigration Policy
This essay was written for Prof. Perry’s Social and Political Philosophy class (AH162) in Minerva University, during November of 2022.
Immigration is a hotly-debated topic in Sweden. Compared to other Nordic countries, Sweden has by far the most immigrants, especially refugees, both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of the population. There are 1.43 million immigrants in Sweden, almost three times as many as Norway and Denmark, which have 0.55 and 0.44 million, respectively (Pettersen & Østby, 2013). Swedish ethno-nationalists such as the Swedish Democrats claim that maintaining Swedish ethnic homogeneity is a valid reason to slow/stop immigration into the country; however, this line of reasoning is faulty since it relies on an internally-inconsistent idea of “Swedishness” and harkens back to an imagined past. Though I agree with Wellman’s assertion that states have the right of association, I argue that Sweden’s 1975 asylum policy is just, and I advocate for its continuation on the basis of cosmopolitanism and utilitarianism. I reason that Sweden’s dedication to multiculturalism necessitates a re-conceptualization of “Swedishness.”
The policy
Traditionally, Sweden implemented a strict assimilation policy. In the 1960s, this policy came under criticism from immigrant activists, intellectuals, and bureaucrats (Ericsson, 2020). In 1975, Sweden implemented a migrant integration policy to promote multiculturalism. A radical break with the earlier laissez-faire system, the policy was condensed into three principal objectives: equality, freedom of choice, and partnership (Westin, 2006). ‘Equality’ meant that the rights of immigrants living in Sweden permanently were to be the same as those of Swedish citizens, including access to the welfare system. Immigrants were to have the ‘freedom’ to choose whether they wanted to assimilate or preserve their unique native culture—this meant providing specialized language support to children of immigrants. Regardless of their preference, according to the objective of ‘partnership,’ their lifestyle should not be in opposition to essential Swedish values and norms (Westin, 2006). ‘Partnership’ would imply, among other things, local and regional voting rights for all resident aliens regardless of origin, with three years of residence as the only condition (Ericsson, 2020). At the time, most immigrants were coming from other Nordic countries, seen as culturally similar to Swedes.
However, immigrant demographics changed. In the mid-1990s, Sweden was hit by a deep economic crisis which, along with joining the EU, led to an increase in emigration. In the 2000s, there was an influx of refugees fleeing war and oppression from predominantly Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, many fled to Sweden, and immigration exceeded all previous records. The 2015 refugee crisis led to a surge of refugees—Sweden reluctantly and temporarily reverted to the EU minimum to quell immigration (Crouch, 2015). In 2017, Syria overtook Finland as the most common country of birth for people born abroad (Sweden’s Population, 2020). The new asylum seekers were seen as culturally ‘different’ to Swedes, inciting immigration and integration issues that polarize Swedish party politics today (Ericsson, 2020).
Arguments for the policy
I am convinced by the argument presented by Christopher Wellman. Wellman defines legitimate states as those who can sufficiently protect the rights of their constituents. He argues that since legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination, they can express freedom of association, and are free to discriminate against certain immigrants on those grounds (Wellman, 2013). However, like Wellman, I draw a difference between what a state has the right to do, and what they normatively ought to do. Just because Sweden has the right to block entry for all immigrants doesn’t mean it is morally permissible.
I normatively agree with political theorist Joseph H. Carens in believing that borders should generally be open, and that people should be allowed to settle in another country, subject only to the same constraints of current citizens. In his article, Carens draws upon John Rawls’s liberalism, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism, and utilitarianism to argue that immigration control is unjust because it perpetuates global inequality and infringes upon the basic human right of the freedom of movement (Carens, 1987). I am convinced by Carens’s argument on the basis of cosmopolitanism—a primary allegiance to the community of human beings in the entire world, rather than individual states (Nussbaum, 1994). I assume that every human being is a moral person and deserves respect, which entails recognizing their freedom and equality—to reject this premise is valuing the lives of some over others, which I believe is immoral. I also assume that historic forces of colonialism, imperialism, and exploitation have led to global inequality—to argue against this is to deny history. Under my first assumption of the inherent equality of all humans, the present socioeconomic inequality is immoral, and we have a moral obligation to help those in dire need, so long as it doesn’t come at excessive cost to ourselves.2
This is relevant to immigration. Regardless of their background or reason for migration (unemployment, war, autocracy, etc.), cosmopolitanism holds that immigrants are human beings deserving of equality and respect. Under a utilitarian model of maximizing well-being (which I understand is difficult to quantitatively measure; I suggest taking several factors into account, such as reported life satisfaction, income, access to basic resources, and rights), an open-door policy of immigration dramatically improves the well-being of the worse-off, at a low cost to the citizens already residing in the country. Therefore, Sweden’s asylum policy is moral. The policy echoes Carens’s beliefs in allowing for immigrants to access the same rights as current citizens, including voting rights and welfare, treating them with the respect that they deserve as human beings.
Fiscal consequences, unemployment, and crime
One counterargument is that immigration comes at a high cost to the citizens residing in the country, thus states are under no moral obligation to have open borders. Many claim that immigration to Sweden, particularly refugees, incurs fiscal consequences and increases crime. I will show that while there is evidence to suggest this on a minor scale, it is not sufficient to restrict liberty under Rawls’s public order restriction.
Sweden operates under the Nordic model of high taxes that support extensive welfare programs working to establish social equality. As stated above, this system can be used by both immigrants and native citizens. Prior to 1999, immigrant net contribution to the public sector was neutral or slightly positive, but that has since changed with shifting immigrant demographics (Ruist, 2015). In 2018, the government spent SEK 17.3 billion (about $1.6 billion) on expenditures toward the introduction of newly arrived immigrants (Slaughter, 2019). Some Swedes also worry about high unemployment rates for immigrants, for which they receive disproportionately more benefits for. In 2017, immigrant unemployment was at 14.8%, compared to 3.9% for domestic-born residents. The main reason for this is because new immigrants cannot speak Swedish, and are thus eligible for only low-skill jobs (Slaughter, 2019). However, I believe that through education programs, such as those implemented under the asylum policy, immigrants can learn the local language, translate their skills (many immigrants were highly educated professionals in their home countries), and begin contributing to Swedish economic growth and stability. In sum, I believe that the economic costs to citizens are not sufficiently high to warrant a restrictive immigration policy, especially since their root causes can be addressed.
As for crime, those with an immigrant background are over-represented in statistics; however, research has shown that a variety of factors help explain a significant portion of the differences in crime rates between natives and immigrants, including linguistic exclusion and absence of skills (Hällsten et al., 2013). Even with the influx of migrants, data released by Sweden’s crime prevention council found no significant increase in crimes from 2015 to 2016 (Baker & Chan, 2017).
In his article, Carens discusses Rawls’s public order restriction—that liberty may be restricted for the sake of liberty. If unrestricted migration leads to the breakdown of order, Carens agrees that it should be curbed; however, there needs to be reasonable expectation that this would happen based on sufficient evidence, which he explains is very difficult (Carens, 1987). The statistics I considered above clearly show that immigration has not led to a “breakdown of order”; the cost of immigration to Swedish citizens is not enough to offset the benefits it brings.
Conserving ethnic homogeneity
Another counterargument comes from ethno-nationalists, arguing that maintaining Swedish ethnic homogeneity is a valid reason to curb immigration into the country. This includes the anti-immigration (specifically non-European immigration) party Sverigedemokraterna, also called Sweden Democrats, or SD. In 2014, Sweden Democrats became the country’s third-largest party, gaining 12.9% of the vote in parliamentary elections. This was up from only 2.9% eight years earlier, displaying their increasing resonance with voters (Baker & Chan, 2017).
Many Swedish Democrats representatives distance themselves from ideas of racial superiority. Blatant racism is rare; rather, they consider themselves ethno-pluralists: they believe that in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, national communities should be solely inhabited by the members of the native population. In short, Sweden belongs to the Swedes. They conceptualize nationality as constituted by an ‘inherited essence,’ echoing Anthony D. Smith’s claims of a ‘distinctive heritage’ (Smith, 1991). Their rhetoric taps into sentiments of nostalgia, a return to the ‘golden days’ of the 1950s prior to waves of immigration (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019). But this harkens back to an imagined, rather than actual, past of national grandeur (Anderson, 1991). The nation is narrated as one unified community of people, despite the overwhelming evidence against such a notion (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019).
Swedish Democrats do not seem to share a clear idea of what authentic Swedish culture consists of, besides a couple shared national dishes and holidays. Rather, they construct Swedish nationalism in contrast to an Orientalized ‘Other’ (Said, 1978). They attribute the problems in modern Swedish society to ‘other cultures,’ predominantly Islam, warning the public about the ‘dying nation’, its ‘terrible plight,’ and the ‘dark future ahead.’ Muslim immigrants are singled out as particularly threatening to European values. This is allegedly because they are the least compatible or inclined to assimilation, though it is clear that racism and xenophobia also play a part in this assumption (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019).
The party’s leader, Jimmie Åkesson, has said that Swedish society was better off when it was seen as more culturally uniform (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019). Similarly, David Miller argues that we have special obligations to those we are bound to by ties of history, common culture, and language. Liberal democratic regimes, he contends, function best when there is sufficient cultural hegemony and trust between compatriots. He believes this is because citizens will be unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to sustain an equitable democratic welfare state without mutual identification (Miller, 2008).
I disagree with Miller’s assertion. Not only is Swedish ‘cultural hegemony’ a contested fact, but like Wellman, I believe that the supposed cultural hegemony of a state does not correlate with how well that state can perform the adequate political functions to protect human rights, which is what gives a state legitimacy (Wellman, 2013). There are several multicultural functioning democracies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The rhetoric of ethno-nationalist groups like the Swedish Democrats thus fails as a genuine argument for closed borders.
Re-thinking “Swedishness”
I believe Sweden’s asylum policy is just. Under the cosmopolitan assumption that human beings deserve freedom and respect, I believe states should generally have open borders, even if they have the right to decide not to. As I have shown, statistics related to the costs of immigration or immigration as a major cause of criminality are not significant enough to warrant what Rawls considers as a ‘breakdown of order.’ Neither does immigration as a threat to the ethno-national identity of the majority hold as a convincing reason to close borders, since ethnic hegemony (per Wellman) has no effect on the legitimacy of a state. In light of Sweden’s dedication to multiculturalism, the very notion of “Swedishness” necessitates a re-conceptualization. Rather than pegging national identity on an imagined past, Swedes must learn to accept the realities of a globalized world and become more inclusive with nationalism.
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